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Abstract: 
 
The new orthodoxy in studies of policy dynamics, including those of Baumgartner and 
Jones, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, and Hall, is that policy change occurs through a homeostatic 
process. “Perturbations” occurring outside of an institutionalized policy subsystem, often 
characterized as some type of societal or political upheaval or learning, are critical for 
explaining the development of profound and durable policy changes which are otherwise limited 
by ‘endogenous’ institutional stability. These homeostatic assumptions, while useful for assessing 
many cases of policy change do not adequately capture the historical patterns of policy 
development found in many sectors. The roots of this problem are traced back to the origins of 
the new orthodoxy in comparative policy research whereby different levels (orders) of policy-
making have been incorrectly juxtaposed, providing a parsimonious, but sometimes empirically 
incorrect, view of policy change. Revising existing taxonomies of policy levels provides a 
superior identification of the processes of change, and uncovers more than one mechanism 
through which significant policy change can occur. Three of these alternative mechanisms - a 
“neo-homeostatic” one in which paradigmatic changes occur through endogenous shifts in 
goals; a ‘quasi-homeostatic’ in which exogenous factors influence changes in objectives and 
settings; and a ‘thermostatic’ one in which durable policy objectives require that settings adapt 
to exogenous changes - are discussed. 
 
 
1. The Contemporary Study of Policy Dynamics: Moves Towards the Development of 
a New Orthodoxy in the 1990s. 
 
The contemporary study of policy dynamics owes a broad debt to two studies which 
appeared 30 years apart:  Charles Lindblom’s 1959 work on incrementalism and Peter Hall 1989 
study of policy paradigms. Both authors worked in a synoptic fashion, utilizing the insights of 
other scholars into aspects of politico-administrative behaviour - in Lindblom’s case Herbert 
Simon’s (1957) insights into organizational behaviour and in Hall’s case Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) 
ideas about the history of scientific advance - to propose and refine the notion that general 
patterns of policy development could not only be identified but predicted.  
Hall’s work served to break a long-term orthodoxy in studies of policy change dominated 
by Lindblom-inspired incrementalism, one which argued that a single type of policy dynamics – 
marginal increments from the status quo – characterized almost all instances of public policy 
change (Hayes 1992; Howlett and Ramesh 2003). Since Hall’s identification of a second pattern 
of change – the broad ‘paradigm’ shift -  scholars studying public policy dynamics have been 
involved in a 20 year process of attempting to reconcile the two patterns and their inter-
relationships. This period has now witnessed the emergence of a new ‘post-incremental’ 
orthodoxy as policy scholars have generally accepted the idea borrowed from paleo-biology 
(Eldredge and Gould 1972) and first put forward in the context of policy dynamics by 
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Baumgartner and Jones in 1991 that periods of marginal adaptation and revolutionary 
transformation are typically linked in a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ pattern of policy change.  
Research undertaken during this period has involved scholars in three related projects 
designed to understand better how incremental and paradigmatic patterns of policy change are 
related to each other.  First, they have been interested in understanding exactly how longstanding 
policies which have tended to develop incrementally can become “punctuated” and shift toward a 
new “equilibrium” (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1993, 2002), after which policy-making, 
though of a different content, settles back into familiar incremental patterns. Second, they have 
been involved in investigating the manner in which enduring institutions structure policy 
dynamics, creating the “musts, mays, and must nots” of policy development (Clemens and Cook 
1999; Steinmo, Thelen et al. 1992). Thirdly, and relatedly, they have focused on understanding 
how changes in policy subsystems (Sabatier 1988; Hall 1993) interact with institutional 
characteristics and serve to, respectively, constrain and facilitate overall patterns of policy 
development.  
The results of such efforts have been fruitful. The discipline now has a much stronger 
understanding about factors such as legislative “attention spans”, “policy windows”, and 
alterations in subsystem beliefs and membership that can result in certain issues coming to the 
fore on policy agendas, precipitating change by shaping what subsystem members deem to be 
appropriate types and modes of policy-making (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 2002; Hall 1989; 
Kingdon 1995; Leach and Sabatier 2005). The field also has a much better understanding of the 
role played by macro, meso and micro-institutions, formalization of issue discourses, and 
routinization of political and administrative affairs in shaping the mobilization of actors and 
restraining change in policy agendas and processes (Weaver and Rockman 1993; Deeg 2005; 
Thelen 2003 and 2004). The well documented self-reinforcing, “path-dependent” effects of  
institutionalization on policy-making   (Hacker 2004; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 1993, 2000; Kay 
2006; Howlett and Rayner 2006) have promoted the idea that paradigmatic policy change, given 
the role played by policy subsystems in this process, requires institutional de-stabilization through 
some kind of exogenous ‘shock’. 
While alluring as a synthetic construction with the potential for great explanatory power 
in many empirical instances, most elements of the new orthodox punctuated equilibrium model 
have not been fully tested or proven (John and Margetts 2003). In what must be worrisome for 
followers of the new orthodoxy, some recent longitudinal studies have not found evidence of the 
exogenously-driven change processes typically associated with it (Cashore and Howlett 2007; 
Coleman, Skogstad and Atkinson 1996).1 In these cases, researchers have found, dramatic policy 
change took place in the absence of institutional change and involved a more complex pattern of 
linkages and change among the levels or orders of policy identified by Hall. Cashore and Howlett 
(2007), for example, found paradigmatic change in US Pacific Northwest forest policy making to 
have occurred in a process in which existing institutions prompted paradigmatic changes in 
logging practices, ‘thermostatically’,  in order to protect endangered species (Cashore and 
Howlett 2006; Cashore and Howlett 2007). Similarly, Coleman, Skogstad and Atkinson’s studies 
of agricultural policy changes in the EU, Canada and Australia over a two decade period revealed 
a pattern in which cumulative incremental changes in policy settings and instruments led, 
gradually, to paradigmatic change (Skogstad 1998; Coleman, Skogstad and Atkinson 1996). Both 
types of seemingly anomalous findings prompt the need for a reassessment of the foundations of 
the now prevailing orthodox view of policy dynamics. 
This suggests either that some elements of the model have been misstated and/or that 
more than one overall model or process of policy dynamics exists and is at work in different 
policy-making circumstances (a possibility suggested by Mortensen, 2005). 
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2.0 Re-Visiting the Foundations of the New Orthodoxy 
 
In re-examining the present orthodoxy it is important to note the four important 
methodological, epistemological, and causal elements of this model which have emerged from 
research over the last two decades. These are: 
 
• First, there is widespread acceptance that any analysis of policy development 
must be historical in nature and cover periods of years or even decades or more 
(Sabatier 1993).2 
 
• Second, it has generally been agreed that political institutions and their embedded 
policy subsystems act as the primary mechanisms of policy reproduction 
(Botcheva and Martin 2001; Clemens and Cook 1999; Howlett and Ramesh 
2003).  
 
• Third, “paradigmatic” change, a process in which there is a fundamental 
realignment of most aspects of policy development, is generally understood to 
occur only when the policy institutions themselves are transformed. In the 
absence of such processes any policy changes are hypothesized to follow 
“incremental” patterns (Deeg 2001; Genschel 1997).  
 
• Fourth, many scholars studying policy dynamics agree that paradigmatic 
transformations or ‘punctuations’ usually occur due to the effects of “external 
perturbations” that cause widespread disruptions in existing policy ideas, beliefs, 
actors, institutions and practices (Smith 2000; Thelen 2003 and 2004; Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1993).  
 
Taken together, these elements provide the basis for the current ‘orthodox’ view of policy 
dynamics: that is, (1) an expectation of a typical set of stability processes (path dependent 
institutionalization) in ongoing policy deliberations; (2) the expectation of a typical pattern of 
policy change (‘punctuated equilibrium’) resulting from the break-down of an institutionalized 
‘policy monopoly’; and (3) a typical explanation for why this occurs (alteration in subsystem 
beliefs and membership usually owing to some type  of societal ‘perturbation’).  
The first and second raise several methodological concerns for scholars interested in 
policy dynamics; especially whether or not a lengthy period of time must elapse before the 
direction of policy change can be discerned, and determining the exact mechanisms through 
which institutions affect policy outcomes (and vice versa). More problematic are the third and 
fourth postulates, drawn from quite selective case and comparative studies on budgetary and 
economic policy-making, as they have difficulty explaining other sectors and cases. To address 
these challenges, we must revisit existing efforts to classify policy, and to characterize its change 
processes. 
 
 
2.1. Hall’s Formulation: The Basis of the Current Orthodoxy and Its Problems 
 
Peter Hall’s (1993) effort is undoubtedly the clearest single statement of the current 
orthodox position on policy dynamics and is the model and classification of policy change most 
often cited in the literature and applied in empirical studies.3 Hall’s work appropriately 
challenged the dominant view in existing scholarship that tended to conflate all the elements of a 
“policy” into a single dependent variable (Heclo 1976, Rose 1976) and to argue that all change 
was incremental in nature. Drawing on divergent cases of economic policy development in Great 
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Britain and France, Hall argued that distinguishing between the means and ends of policymaking 
and between abstract and concrete policy decisions was necessary to gain new insights into 
processes of policy stability and development.  
Such an approach, for Hall, revealed three principal elements or components of a policy 
which, he argued, could change at different rates (small scale, typical, incremental and larger-
scale, rarer, paradigmatic form) with different consequences for overall policy dynamics. “First 
order” changes occurred when the calibrations of policy instruments, such as increasing the 
safety or automobile emissions requirements, changed within existing institutional and instrument 
confines.  “Second order” changes involved alterations to dominant types of policy instruments 
utilized within an existing policy regime, such as switching from an administered emission 
standard to an emissions tax. “Third order” changes  involved shifts in overall abstract policy 
goals such as, in the pollution example, the 1990s shift in many countries from a focus upon ex 
post end-of-pipe regulation to ex ante preventative production process design. More significantly, 
Hall linked each change process to a different specific cause agent and to a specific overall 
pattern of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ policy dynamics. In his view first- and second-order changes 
were typically incremental and usually the result of activities endogenous to a policy subsystem 
while third-order changes were paradigmatic and occurred as anomalies arose between expected 
and actual results of policy implementation. The events triggering anomalies and the response to 
them on the part of policy-makers (such as contestation within a policy community on the best 
course of action to pursue, or the development of new ideas about policy problems and/or 
solution) were linked to exogenous events, especially societal policy learning  
This model of change, which captures the current punctuated equilibrium orthodoxy is 
what cybernetic theorists referred to as a ‘homeostatic’ one; that is, one in which positive and 
negative feedback mechanisms allow a new equilibrium to be reached after stable system 
parameters have been altered by outside forces (Steinbruner, 1974). This change process involves 
a system which, like a spinning top, is constantly undergoing some kinds of (incremental) 
changes, but remains in one place (equilibrium) until an outside force (a foot, for example, in the 
case of the spinning top analogy) moves it to a new location where, after this “punctuation,” a 
new equilibrium is established (Steinbruner 1974; Mertha and Lowry 2006). Without exogenous 
shocks, in Hall’s model, it would be expected that existing policy elements would tend to arrange 
themselves in a self-perpetuating or equilibrating order, allowing (unspecified but incremental) 
changes in settings and instruments to occur but without altering policy goals. 
The recent analyses of long-term policy change in areas such as agricultural and natural 
resource policy-making cited above, question the universality of this patterns and hence challenge 
the last two arguments in the now prevailing orthodoxy on the nature of policy dynamics. 
Revisiting the existing literature on policy change, a process justified given its inconsistency with 
these empirical studies, reveals two problems that require the reformulation of two of the basic 
building blocks upon which the current orthodoxy was constructed. First, existing taxonomies 
designed to measure policy conflate very different forms or elements of policy. Second, and 
related, classifications of the types of changes different policies can, and do, undergo has been 
both underdeveloped and limited. Failure to address these problems resulted in several erroneous 
conclusions being drawn by Hall and others about the factors underlying policy dynamics. 
 
 
3.0. Measuring the Dependent Variable: The Need to Precisely Disaggregate Different 
Elements of Policy in Order to Construct Accurate Models of Policy Dynamics 
 
The first problem with the current orthodoxy which must be rectified concerns the widely 
accepted model of policy composition used to describe historical patterns of policy development. 
This is the ‘dependent variable problem’ uncovered by research into social and welfare policy 
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change (Green-Pedersen 2004; Kuhner 2007; Knill 2001).  As Green (2004) put it in his work on 
social welfare policy change: 
It is clear that the dependent variable problem is crucial for the entire debate, and 
that disagreement about the dependent variable is a major obstacle for cumulative 
knowledge about welfare state retrenchment… To put it bluntly, the debate about 
explanations of variations in retrenchment cannot move beyond the stage of 
hypotheses before the dependent variable problem has been addressed, and the 
same goes for the debate about welfare state persistence or change. Addressing 
the dependent variable problem should have high priority within the 
retrenchment literature (p. 4). 
 
Similarly, Paul Pierson (2001) has argued that “it is difficult to exaggerate” the obstacle 
the dissensus over the definition, operationalization and measurement of policy change creates for 
comparative research and theory construction into policy dynamics.  
To date, the operationalization and measurement of the dependent variable in studies of 
policy dynamics -  “policy change” – based mainly on Hall’s ‘three order’ model, has led many 
scholars to inadvertently conflate distinct change processes present in specific elements of policy. 
Uncovering these “hidden” and more complex patterns of policy development challenges the way 
most policy scholars measure and classify overall policy dynamics as either “paradigmatic” or 
“incremental” (Howlett and Ramesh 2002; Lindner 2003; Lindner and Rittberger 2003).  
 
 
3.1. An Improved Model of Policy Composition 
 
Halls’ work was path breaking in its linking of different overall policy development 
processes to changes in the order or level of policy in flux. Still, this initial conceptual effort at 
classification requires re-calibration in the light of his own logic, as well as in light of the 
empirical evidence gathered in many cases of policy change analyzed since his work was first 
published.  
That is, according to Hall’s own emphasis on distinguishing abstract or 
theoretical/conceptual goals from specific programme content or objectives, and operational 
settings or calibrations, along with his distinction between the aims or “ends” of policy and its 
actual policy requirements (“means”), it is possible to discern six, rather than three, policy 
elements that can undergo change (see Figure 1). 
The implication of this taxonomy is that every “policy” is in fact a more complex regime 
of ends and means-related goals (more abstract), objectives (less abstract), and settings (least 
abstract) than was suggested by the use of Hall’s original de-composition and definition of the 
elements of policy into three ‘orders’. Paying attention to these regime differences, and how each 
element changes or remains stable over long periods of time, results in a much more complex 
picture of policy dynamics than usually found in the existing literature derived from the orthodox 
model (Liefferink 2006).4  
Reconceptualizing the number and type of policy elements found in Hall’s work has 
serious consequences for his (and the current orthodoxy’s) linking of policy elements to specific 
drivers of policy change and for the consideration of the number and type of possible overall 
patterns of policy regime change. In particular, two implications result. First, the links between 
policy components and endogenous and exogenous sources of policy change are more complex 
than Hall suggested (Bannink and Hoogenboom 2007). Second, existing classifications of 
“paradigmatic” and “incremental” policy development must be revisited so that we can better 
capture the complex interplay of change processes among the six different policy components. 
That is, in addition to distinguishing six different levels of policy, which can be used to generate 
more nuanced descriptions of historical patterns of policy development, it is equally necessary 
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that the proper classification tools be available to assess the degree and overall type of policy 
change found in any such description (Kuhner 2007).  
 
 
Figure 1 - A Modified Taxonomy of Policy Components Following Hall 
(Cells contain examples of each measure) 
 
 
   Policy Content  
  High Level 
Abstraction 
Programme Level 
Operationalization 
Specific On-the-Ground 
Measures 
 Policy 
Ends or 
Aims 
GOALS  
What General 
Types of Ideas 
Govern Policy 
Development? 
 
 
(e.g. environmental 
 protection, 
economic 
 development) 
OBJECTIVES 
What Does Policy 
Formally Aim to 
Address? 
 
(e.g. saving wilderness 
or species habitat,  
increasing harvesting 
levels to create 
processing jobs) 
SETTINGS 
What are the Specific 
On-the-ground 
Requirements  of Policy 
 
 
(e.g. considerations about 
the optimal size of 
designated stream-bed 
riparian zones, or 
sustainable levels of 
harvesting) 
Policy Focus     
 Policy 
Means 
or Tools 
INSTRUMENT 
LOGIC 
What General 
Norms Guide 
Implementation 
 Preferences? 
 
(e.g. preferences for 
the use of coercive 
instruments, or 
moral suasion) 
MECHANISMS 
What Specific Types 
of 
Instruments are 
Utilized? 
 
 
(e.g. the use of different 
tools such as tax 
incentives, or public 
enterprises) 
CALIBRATIONS 
What are the Specific 
 Ways in Which the 
 Instrument is used? 
 
(e.g. designations of higher 
levels of subsidies, the use 
of mandatory vs voluntary 
regulatory guidelines or 
standards) 
Source: Modified from Cashore and Howlett (2007) 
 
 
3.2. Characterizing Change Patterns the Dependent Variable Undergoes: Distinguishing 
Possible Patterns of Policy Development Based on More Accurate Models of Policy De-
Composition 
 
The effort to better distinguish possible patterns of policy development sensitive to a 
model with six regime elements rather than three requires revisiting widely accepted assumptions 
within policy studies that originated in Simon’s (1957) and Lindblom’s (1959) path-breaking 
works on the subject of satisfycing and incremental policy-change. The general idea that emerged 
from these articles, which have influenced generations of scholars, including Hall, is that 
incremental change is associated with marginal changes in policy means and ends is treated as 
being synonymous with a pattern of relatively long-lasting policy stability (Bendor 1995; Hayes 
1992). Paradigmatic change, on the other hand, has been treated as an abnormal, atypical, 
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relatively unstable, and usually short-lived process associated with changes in policy ends 
(Sabatier 1988; Baumgartner and Jones 1991 and 2002; Lustick 1980). The development of 
“punctuated equilibrium” models underlined the importance of understanding not just incremental 
or paradigmatic policy processes, per se, but also the manner in which these two types of change 
are linked together and the propensity different sectors, issue areas, or policy subsystems have to 
undergo these processes at different points in time (Baumgartner and Jones 2002). 
Applying such an appreciation of policy dynamics, however, requires both a clear 
definition of what constitutes ‘incremental change’ so that it can be distinguished from 
‘paradigmatic’, and proof that these two modes of change are the only ones possible in any given 
policy area. But, as has been pointed out for some time, neither a clear definition nor an 
exhaustive taxonomy of change types currently exists so that both incremental and paradigmatic 
change remain under-specified entities (Berry 1990; Bailey and O’Connor 1975; Kuhn 1974; 
Capano 2003).  
An example of the problems encountered to date with respect to defining and classifying 
modes of change can be found in Durant and Diehl’s (1989) work which followed paleobiological 
practice in arguing that policy change types could be distinguished according to their mode 
(incremental versus paradigmatic) and speed or tempo (rapid versus slow) (see also Hayes 1992). 
This (see Figure 2 below) generated four distinct types of change: 
 
 
FIGURE 2: A Basic Taxonomy of Policy Change by Mode and Speed 
(cells contain typical ‘modes’ of change) 
 
  Tempo or Speed of Change 
Mode of Change Fast Slow 
Paradigmatic Classic Paradigmatic Gradual Paradigmatic 
 
Incremental 
 
Rapid Incremental Classic Incremental  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Durant and Diehl 1989 
 
 
 
 Such formulations are useful but this specific method of classifying types of change is 
problematic in that (1) it includes the same concept (mode of change) as both a dependent and an 
independent variable; and (2) in doing so it ignores the significant dimension of the directionality 
of changes as opposed to simply a concern for speed or rapidity. That is, what is most important 
is not the “size” of moves away from the status quo over time per se, but whether these changes 
are cumulative, i.e., leading away from an existing equilibrium toward another, or whether they 
represent a fluctuation consistent with an existing policy equilibrium (on directionality see Nisbet 
1972),  Reconceptualizing modes of policy change as the resultant of the interplay of tempo and 
cumulative directionality provides a superior model of policy dynamics to that found in earlier 
work focusing on mode and tempo. 
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3.3. Transcending the Current Orthodoxy: Thermostatic, Neo- and Quasi-Homeostatic versus 
Homeostatic Models of Policy Change 
 
Advancing the study of policy dynamics beyond the current orthodoxy requires a new 
taxonomy of policy change processes which takes the criteria of directionality seriously in re-
aggregating shifts in specific policy elements. The homeostatic model, as suggested above, is 
only one possible overall model or pattern of policy change (Mortensen 2005). Other 
arrangements of system elements and change drivers exist and should not be ruled out a priori as 
appropriate templates for the forms of policy dynamics found in specific sectors or issue areas. 
For example, one obvious such alternative would be a Hall-type regime, but where changes in 
goals are driven endogenously in a process of gradual paradigmatic change or what might more 
accurately be referred to as “progressive incrementalism.” Empirical evidence for this “neo-
homeostatic” model can be found in Coleman et al’s 1996 work on agricultural policy change and 
in Capano’s 2003 study of Italian administrative reform where small-scale changes in policy 
settings built up over the years until the origins of the overall policy were unrecognizable – in the 
agriculture case through the alteration of the level of subsides, and in the Italian administrative 
case through variations in hiring and personnel policies. 
This variant on the homeostatic model does not in anyway exhaust the number of 
possible overall patterns of change. Others would include a “quasi-homeostatic” pattern in which 
goals are stable but where exogenously driven changes in end- or means-related objectives can 
cause paradigmatic shifts to occur. This was what appeared to happen, for example, in welfare 
reform driven by international organizations or influenced by “lesson-drawing” (Lee and Strang 
2006; Rose 1991; Ramesh and Howlett 2006) in which efforts to re-order welfare programs to 
make them more efficient and market oriented resulted in changes in policy goals (from ‘welfare’ 
to ‘workfare’). Finally, as pointed out above and has been observed in the case of US Pacific 
Northwest forest policy, a ‘thermostatic’ model (Buckley 1968; Gell-Mann 1992) also exists in 
which goals are set broadly enough to allow, or simply do not figure in, paradigmatic change 
driven endogenously by major alterations in end-related objectives and settings (Wlezien 1995; 
Cashore and Howlett 2007).5  In the PNW forestry case durable objectives can create an 
institutionalized, “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olson 2004) in which policy settings are 
likely to follow a classic incremental pattern of development until such time a built-in 
thermostatic mechanism is “tripped,” resulting in classic paradigmatic change through changes in 
policy settings and objectives.6 The nature of these overall patterns and their relationship to the 
exogenous or endogenous origins of, and the key policy element assumed to lead, change, is set 
out in Figure 3. 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Basic System Possibilities and Significant/Paradigmatic Change Processes 
(cells contain general system type and policy change pattern) 
 
 
 Policy Element Leading Change  
 Change in Abstract Ideas 
 
Change in Programmatic 
Objectives 
 Change in On-the-
Ground Specifications 
Ends Classic  (I) Homeostatic 
“Punctuated Equilibrium” 
Thermostatic 
“Planned Paradigmatic” 
Neo-Homeostatic 
“Gradual Paradigmatic” 
Means Classic-Homeostatic (II) 
“Instrumental Policy 
Learning” 
Quasi-Homeostatic (II) 
“Instrument Objectives 
Lesson-Drawing” 
Neo-Homeostatic (II) 
“Gradual Paradigmatic” 
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4. Conclusion 
 
Three findings and recommendations emerge from this analysis for current and future 
studies of policy change. The first is that scholars must be aware of the ‘dependent variable’ 
problem in studies of policy dynamics must develop taxonomies that disentangle the policies they 
are measuring and describing (Mortensen 1995; Robinson and Caver 2006; Robinson, Caver, 
Meier, O’Toole 2007). Failing to distinguish between different levels of policy can improperly 
juxtapose several distinct types of policy development and present a misleading picture of the 
actual pattern of change present in an empirical case.  
Second, and relatedly, assessments of policy dynamics must take the “direction” of 
change into account. That is, rather than focus on the ‘mode’ of change in assessing possible 
change types, they should distinguish policy developments that move slightly in different 
directions over time but never deviate much from the status quo (policies in equilibrium), from 
those that move in the same (new) direction over time (cumulative change) (Deeg 2001; 
Goldstone 1998; Pierson 2000).  
Third, broad-based theories of institutional and policy change need to be careful in 
attributing exogenous or endogenous sources of policy development. Path-breaking work by Hall 
on homeostatic models linking exogenous change in goals to changes in end and means-related 
objectives and settings may need to be modified to take into account both the possible 
endogeneity of change processes and the different institutional structures that can permit change 
to occur in other ways: for example, through neo- or quasi-homeostatic means or in a thermostatic 
fashion (Braun and Benninghoff 2003; Daugbjerg 1997 and 2003).  
In summary, the reconceptualization of the ‘dependent variable’ in studies of policy 
dynamics undertaken above, and the subsequent identification of six levels of policy, and four 
patterns of historical policy development, has helped to uncover additional overall patterns of 
policy development often elided by the current punctuated equilibrium orthodoxy on policy 
change. While more research is required in order to determine if other patterns exist, and which 
patterns prevail in different circumstances and why, this is an essential re-conceptualization if 
studies of policy dynamics are going to continue to progress. 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
                                                       
1 In a related critique, Hacker (2004) found that studies finding significant changes policy stasis 
failed to assess the changing impacts of institutional stability when the problem the policies were seeking to 
address were undergoing significant changes.  
2 This observation is explicitly raised in every project by Baumgartner and Jones on punctuated 
equilibrium and in Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith’s work on “advocacy coalitions,” as well as 
being implicit in the broad field of historical institutionalism (Sabatier 1988 and 1993; Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, Mahoney 2000; Lindner and Rittberger 2003).  
3 Baumgartner and Jones many works on the subject provided the empirical backing required to 
support the idea that incremental policy making was in fact routinely punctuated by dramatic change. Their 
focus on budgetary policy was not matched by the development of generalizable taxonomy for measuring 
policy dynamics in other spheres (Baumgartner and Jones 1993 and 2002; Mortensen 2005; John and 
Margettes 2003). 
4 For similar models based on a similar critique of Hall, see Daugbjerg (1997) and Smith (2000). 
These six categories are inspired from much of the work on applied policy analysis that teach students to 
break policy down into their “goals,” “operationalized” objectives, and specific criteria and who likewise 
take pains to distinguish policy instruments from “on-the-ground” policy requirements (Weimer and Vining 
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1999). Such a distinction is also consistent with the work of Howlett (2000) who has hypothesized and 
empirically demonstrated the important and independent causal impacts of process (means) based policy 
instruments. Similarly, Sabatier’s ACF distinguishes different causal influences on different measures of 
policy, theorizing that “core values” or ideas behind policy can rarely change in the absence of societal 
transformation, but that “secondary belief systems” can lead to changes in what we are defining as “means-
oriented” policy objectives and policy settings, as advocacy coalitions undergo “learning” about causal 
mechanisms within the policy process (Sabatier 1988). 
5 In the Pacific Northwest forest policy case, formalized policy objectives were very durable and 
survived changing or fluctuating policy goals. This type of change process involves a system in which 
policy objectives obtain “institutional status” and prevent or control the amount of change possible in 
policy settings. Whether such institutionalized objectives will prevent or require changes in policy settings 
depends on their internal logics. (Cashore and Howlett 2006 and 2007). 
6 Clemens and Cook’s (1999) work shows that “institutions” can be seen as involving formal and 
informal rules, policies and standard operating procedures that bind and guide behavior. The “binding” 
aspect is important because not all institutions, even those emanating from constitutional sources, are 
enduring. They can be, rather “soft” institutions (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Giuliani 1999; Pollock, Lilie and 
Vittes 1993) that quickly adapt to outside pressure and allow significant changes to occur in policy 
outcomes. 
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